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Institutional Favoritism, Income, and Political Trust: Evidence from Jordan

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What is the relationship between institutional favoritism, economic well-being, and political trust? Due to the role that East Bank tribes played in supporting the monarchy during the state's formative years, Jordan has institutionalized a type of political discrimination that privileges East Bank Jordanians over Palestinian Jordanians. An empirical examination of the political institutions of the state reveals that such discrimination remains pervasive. It was subsequently theorized that institutional favoritism's impact on political trust is conditional on income due to the greater salience of group identity among individuals with lower incomes. Regression analyses of survey data reveal a consistent negative correlation between political trust and income among East Bank Jordanians. There is little evidence of a substantively meaningful unconditional relationship between national origin and political trust.

Keywords: DISCRIMINATION; IDENTITY SALIENCE; INCOME; INSTITUTIONAL FAVORITISM; MIDDLE EAST POLITICS; POLITICAL TRUST

Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: July 1, 2022

This article was made available online on November 12, 2021 as a Fast Track article with title: "Institutional Favoritism, Income, and Political Trust: Evidence from Jordan".

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  • Comparative Politics is an international journal that publishes scholarly articles devoted to the comparative analysis of political institutions and behavior. It was founded in 1968 to further the development of comparative political theory and the application of comparative theoretical analysis to the empirical investigation of political issues. Comparative Politics communicates new ideas and research findings to social scientists, scholars, and students, and is valued by experts in research organizations, foundations, and consulates throughout the world.
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