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Legal Regulation and the Juridification of Party Governance

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Although democratic states increasingly regulate political parties, we know little about how legal environments shape parties' internal lives. This article conceptualizes and measures the "juridification" of party organizations' conflict regulation regimes: that is, the extent to which parties replicate external legal standards (e.g. norms of due process) within their own procedures. Formulating hypotheses on juridification within different parties and legal environments, we examine intra-party juridification across four democracies with most different party law provisions. While party juridification varies—reflecting parties' ideological differences—in contexts where organizational governance remains unregulated, once intra-organizational governance is subject to statutory constraints, parties emulate legal norms embedded in the state legal system, transcending what is legally required, which has important repercussions for how the law shapes civil society organizations generally.

Keywords: CONFLICT REGULATION; ORGANIZATIONAL GOVERNANCE; PARTY LAW; PARTY REGULATION; STATUTES

Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: October 1, 2020

This article was made available online on April 22, 2020 as a Fast Track article with title: "Legal Regulation and the Juridification of Party Governance".

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  • Comparative Politics is an international journal that publishes scholarly articles devoted to the comparative analysis of political institutions and behavior. It was founded in 1968 to further the development of comparative political theory and the application of comparative theoretical analysis to the empirical investigation of political issues. Comparative Politics communicates new ideas and research findings to social scientists, scholars, and students, and is valued by experts in research organizations, foundations, and consulates throughout the world.
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