@article {Balán:2011:0010-4159:459,
title = "Competition by Denunciation: The Political Dynamics of Corruption Scandals in Argentina and Chile",
journal = "Comparative Politics",
parent_itemid = "infobike://cuny/cp",
publishercode ="cuny",
year = "2011",
volume = "43",
number = "4",
publication date ="2011-07-01T00:00:00",
pages = "459-478",
itemtype = "ARTICLE",
issn = "0010-4159",
eissn = "2151-6227",
url = "https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/cuny/cp/2011/00000043/00000004/art00006",
doi = "doi:10.5129/001041511796301597",
author = "Bal{\’a}n, Manuel",
abstract = "Corruption has become a key concern throughout the world. Most of what is known about corruption comes from instances in which misdeeds become public, generating a scandal. Why do some acts of corruption become scandals and others do not? Corruption scandals are not triggered by corruption,
but rather are initially caused by dynamics of political competition within government. Insiders leak information on misdeeds in order to gain power within the coalition or party in power. A powerful opposition, contrary to common belief, acts as a constraint for insiders, making corruption
scandals less likely. These arguments are evaluated using empirical evidence from Argentina and Chile (19892008). The findings support the notion that corruption scandals emerge as a consequence of political competition.",
}