Survival of the Fittest? Cabinet Duration in Postcommunist Europe
Governments in postcommunist Europe are not slaves to their institutions, unable to extend their time in office beyond the constraints imposed by their institutional arrangement. Cabinet duration is tied to performance in office, characterized by economic success. Duration models show that governments in postcommunist Europe are similar to those in western Europe, even though some states lack party institutionalization and strong partisan attachments. Institutional arrangements, including the effective number of parties in government and the type of government, combine with economic performance to affect the survival rates of postcommunist governments.
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Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: April 1, 2008
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- Comparative Politics is an international journal that publishes scholarly articles devoted to the comparative analysis of political institutions and behavior. It was founded in 1968 to further the development of comparative political theory and the application of comparative theoretical analysis to the empirical investigation of political issues. Comparative Politics communicates new ideas and research findings to social scientists, scholars, and students, and is valued by experts in research organizations, foundations, and consulates throughout the world.
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