Moving between frustration and anger
Frustration is widely recognised to be central to many cases of moral anger in a political context, yet little philosophical attention has been paid to it. In this paper, I offer a much-needed philosophical analysis of frustration, working primarily with the example of the recent South African student protests. By developing a deeper philosophical understanding of frustration and its connections to moral anger, I argue that the movement between the two has a couple of important aspects. First, the movement involves a transformation from simply responding to some opposition to viewing that opposition as wrongfully imposed by an agent; second, in the cases that are my focus, the movement is a response to a persistent opposition that is compounded by an erosion of trust, confidence and hope within a moral community, which ultimately changes the very nature of the opposition into a form of wrongdoing. These aspects allow us to assess the appropriateness of the movement, thereby developing a rich analysis of moral anger arising out of frustration in a political context.
- Analysing how moral anger can arise out of frustration can be insightful for moral philosophy.
- The movement between frustration and moral anger highlights a breakdown in moral relationships.
- Moral anger arising from frustration involves a transformation in how an opposition is viewed.
- Mounting frustration can transform what was once a mere opposition into a wrongdoing.
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