Skip to main content
padlock icon - secure page this page is secure

Sticking points: common‐agency problems and contracting in the US healthcare system

Buy Article:

$59.00 + tax (Refund Policy)

We propose a “common‐agency” model for explaining inefficient contracting in the US healthcare system. Common‐agency problems arise when multiple payers seek to motivate a provider to invest in improved care coordination. We highlight the possibility of “sticking points,” that is, Pareto‐dominated equilibria in which payers coordinate around contracts which give weak incentives to the provider. Sticking points rationalize three hard‐to‐explain features of the US healthcare system: widespread fee‐for‐service arrangements; problematic care coordination; and the historical reliance on single‐specialty practices to deliver care. The model also analyzes the effects of policies promoting more efficient contracting between payers and providers.
No References
No Citations
No Supplementary Data
No Article Media
No Metrics

Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: June 1, 2019

  • Access Key
  • Free content
  • Partial Free content
  • New content
  • Open access content
  • Partial Open access content
  • Subscribed content
  • Partial Subscribed content
  • Free trial content
Cookie Policy
Cookie Policy
Ingenta Connect website makes use of cookies so as to keep track of data that you have filled in. I am Happy with this Find out more