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Relational contracting and endogenous formation of teamwork

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We study a relational contracting model with two agents where each agent faces multiple tasks: effort toward the agent's own project and helping effort toward another agent's project. We show that the optimal task structure is either specialization without help or teamwork with a substantial amount of help: teamwork with a small amount of help is never optimal. Specialization with high‐powered incentives can be implemented by relative performance evaluation. However, under teamwork, the evaluation scheme must be substantially different to overcome the multitasking problem. Consequently, a small amount of help is dominated by specialization with high powered incentives.
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Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: May 1, 2017

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