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Information and delay in an agency model

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This article studies how delay in contracting depends on an exogenous signal. The agent whose cost is his private information may produce in the first period or be delayed until the second period. A signal about the cost of the agent is available between the two periods. The quality of the good can vary; in the benchmark case of no signal, the principal offers the standard Baron-Myerson contract and there is no delay. Delay is determined by the considerations at the margin and may increase or decrease with a better signal. The value of information can be negative, as a better signal may aggravate the principal's commitment problem. A better signal may also increase the agent's rent and decrease social welfare.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: University Carlos III de Madrid;, Email: [email protected]

Publication date: September 1, 2010

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