Skip to main content
padlock icon - secure page this page is secure

Transparency and incentives among peers

Buy Article:

$59.00 + tax (Refund Policy)

This article studies the effect of transparency among peers on the principal's cost of providing incentives. Using directed graphs to represent peer information, we show that under complementarity the cost of providing incentives is decreasing with the level of transparency within the organization. We also investigate the role of the architecture of the information in boosting incentives. In arguing that substitution impedes the benefits of transparency, we will compare function-based teams with process-based teams, showing that the latter are more effective in providing incentives.
No References
No Citations
No Supplementary Data
No Article Media
No Metrics

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: The Hebrew University of Jerusalem;, Email: [email protected]

Publication date: September 1, 2010

  • Access Key
  • Free content
  • Partial Free content
  • New content
  • Open access content
  • Partial Open access content
  • Subscribed content
  • Partial Subscribed content
  • Free trial content
Cookie Policy
X
Cookie Policy
Ingenta Connect website makes use of cookies so as to keep track of data that you have filled in. I am Happy with this Find out more