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Putting Pluralism in its PlaceThis paper was first presented at a session on pluralism at the 1st Veritas Philosophy Conference at Yonsei University in Seoul, June 2014. My thanks go to Tim Fuller and Nikolaj Pedersen for the invitation to and organization of the conference, and to all those who attended and offered their feedback. Thanks go also to Derek Baker, Sam Baron, Jeremy Wyatt, and an anonymous referee for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Special thanks go to Dorit Bar‐On and Keith Simmons, and the members of their seminar on truth at the University of Connecticut in the spring of 2015. The work described in this paper was substantially supported by a grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (HKU 23400014).

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Pluralism about truth is the view that there are many properties, not just one, in virtue of which things are true. Pluralists hope to dodge the objections that face traditional monistic substantive views of truth (such as the correspondence theory), as well as those facing deflationary theories of truth. More specifically, pluralists hope to advance an explanatorily potent understanding of truth that can capture the subtleties of various realist and anti‐realist domains of discourse, all while avoiding the scope problem. I offer a new objection to pluralism that challenges its fundamental commitment to there being a set of alethic properties in virtue of which claims are true. In its place I offer an alternative view that merges standard truthmaker theory with a primitivist conception of truth. This combination of views satisfies the theoretical desires that pluralists claim for themselves, but without taking on pluralism's host of challenges and problems.
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Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: January 1, 2018

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