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I argue that in rejecting Cartesian ‘mind’ and retaining Cartesian ‘body’, materialism/physicalism falls to the allure of three charming but deadly ‘eliminative’ identities: perceivable properties become particles in motion; perception, by being ‘sensationized’, turns into neuronal activity; and a perceiver becomes a brain in a body. In rebuttal I argue that ‘particles in motion’ does not nullify but instead preserves the perceivable properties it seeks to explain; ‘neuronal activity’ is not a reduction of, but is doubtlessly necessary to, perception; and a perceiver is not a brain in a body, since ‘body’ in the Cartesian/materialist context is a conceptual confusion that reifies a human being's physical side.
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Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: University of Oregon at Eugene

Publication date: April 1, 1998

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