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Virtue Epistemology, Enhancement, and Control

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An interesting aspect of Ernest Sosa's () recent thinking is that enhanced performances (for example, the performance of an athlete under the influence of a performance‐enhancing drug) fall short of aptness, and this is because such enhanced performances do not issue from genuine competences on the part of the agent. This paper explores in some detail the implications of such thinking in Sosa's wider virtue epistemology, with a focus on cases of cognitive enhancement. A certain puzzle is then highlighted, and the solution proposed draws both from the recent moral responsibility literature on guidance control (e.g., Fischer and Ravizza 1998; Fischer ) and from work on cognitive integration in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers ; Clark 2008; Pritchard ; Palermos ; and Carter ).
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Keywords: Ernest Sosa; cognitive enhancement; intellectual responsibility; performance epistemology; virtue epistemology

Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: 01 April 2018

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