Reducing Asymmetry in Countering Unmanned Aerial Systems

Current Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS) rely heavily on low-efficiency techniques such as broadband radio frequency (RF) jamming and high-intensity lasers. Not only do such techniques come at the cost of second and third order effects—such as collateral jamming risks to operational systems, a large RF footprint, and high energy use—but they also present an asymmetry between threat and response. Many commercial, off-the-shelf UAS devices are inexpensive compared to the C-UAS systems historically under focus in DoD acquisition. This work argues for leveling that asymmetry by exploring C-UAS autonomy-on-autonomy options by using cyberattack payload capabilities residing on a UAS. By reducing the attack surface to focus on a particular target, these cyber techniques provide scalpel-edged control to the operator, reducing risk to own systems, RF footprint, and collateral damage.