Deflationism, the Problem of Representation, and Horwich's Use Theory of Meaning

Author: Gupta A.

Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 67, Number 3, 1 November 2003 , pp. 654-666(13)

Publisher: International Phenomenological Society

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Abstract:

This paper contains a critical discussion of Paul Horwich's use theory of meaning. Horwich attempts to dissolve the problem of representation through a combination of his theory of meaning and a deflationism about truth. I argue that the dissolution works only if deflationism makes strong and dubious claims about semantic concepts. Horwich offers a specific version of the use theory of meaning. I argue that this version rests on an unacceptable identification: an identification of principles that are fundamental to an explanation of the acceptance of sentences with principles that are fundamental to meaning.

Document Type: Commentary

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