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Competitive Screening of a Heterogeneous Labor Force and Corporate Teamwork Attitude

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The aim of this paper is to analyze the influence of competition on the structure of incentive schemes, workforce composition, and the degree of cooperation within firms. We show that in equilibrium high-skilled workers, in order to distinguish themselves from the low-skilled, choose the incentive schemes that strongly rely on their own as well as their teammates' performance. They work harder on their own task and are more team-oriented than low-skilled workers. Our paper stresses the sorting role of the incentives and provides a rationale for the emergence of different corporate teamwork practices. (JEL: D2, D8, J2, J3, M5)
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Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: 01 September 2017

This article was made available online on 07 December 2016 as a Fast Track article with title: "Competitive Screening of a Heterogeneous Labor Force and Corporate Teamwork Attitude".

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  • Founded as Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft in 1844.

    As one of the oldest journals in the field of political economy, the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) deals traditionally with the problems of economics, social policy, and their legal framework. JITE is listed in the Journal of Economic Literature, the Social Science Citation Index, the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences, and COREJ.

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    From 2013 on all accepted articles are published in an Online First version (in their final layout) to make them searchable and citable by their DOI immediately after peer review and acceptance. Once the article is published in an issue of the journal, the Online First version will be removed.

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