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Unemployment Accounts and Private Insurance Markets

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Whereas a large body of the literature on unemployment accounts (UAs) explores how they could improve labor market and saving incentives, this paper examines how their implementation affects the form and extent of private insurance markets' incompleteness. The analysis is conducted from an alternative perspective. Instead of assuming that markets are nonexistent for exogenous reasons, the source of incomplete risk sharing is modeled endogenously, relying on the assumption of the limited enforceability of private contracts. If the only enforcement mechanism is the threat of exclusion from future insurance markets upon default on existing contracts, the introduction of UAs implies stricter no-default conditions, restricts the set of individually rational contracts, and then limits the private risk sharing.
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Keywords: INSURANCE MARKETS; UNEMPLOYMENT ACCOUNTS

Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: 2017-03-01

More about this publication?
  • As one of the world's oldest professional journals in public finance, founded in 1884, FinanzArchiv (FA) publishes original work from all fields of public economics which are of interest to an international readership, e.g. taxation, public debt, public goods, public choice, federalism, market failure, social policy, and the welfare state. Special emphasis is on high-quality theoretical and empirical papers on current policy issues.

    FA is a peer-reviewed journal commited to a prompt turnaround of submissions.

    FA is listed in the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI), in Current Contents/Social and Behavioral Sciences, in Econ Lit, in the Journal of Economic Literature, in IDEAS and RePEc and in the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences.

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