The Politics of Minister Retention in Presidential Systems: Technocrats, Partisans, and Government Approval
This article examines the impact of presidential approval and individual minister profiles on minister turnover. It claims that in order to prioritize sustainable policy performance and cabinet loyalty, government chiefs protect and remove technocrats, partisans, and outsider ministers
conditional on government approval. The study offers an operational definition of minister profiles that relies on fuzzy-set measures of technical expertise and political affiliation, and tests the hypotheses using survival analysis with an original dataset for the Argentine case (1983–2011).
The findings show that popular presidents are likely to protect experts more than partisan ministers, but not outsiders.
Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: 01 April 2015
- Comparative Politics is an international journal that publishes scholarly articles devoted to the comparative analysis of political institutions and behavior. It was founded in 1968 to further the development of comparative political theory and the application of comparative theoretical analysis to the empirical investigation of political issues. Comparative Politics communicates new ideas and research findings to social scientists, scholars, and students, and is valued by experts in research organizations, foundations, and consulates throughout the world.
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