Assessing the New Constitutionalism
Initial scholarly exuberance over the global spread of bills of rights and judicial review has given way to a spate of studies that bemoan the trend as fundamentally antidemocratic. This review offers an empirically informed critique of these new, more skeptical studies. It highlights ways in which selection and tenure rules for high court judges vary across cases, describes a number of institutional mechanisms designed to mitigate judicial supremacy in different countries, and offers examples of the ways that some new constitutionalist countries have sought to facilitate popular access to courts and to charge courts with protecting popular interests. More comparative work on the effects of this variation on political practice and policy outcomes would be welcome.
Document Type: Review Article
Publication date: 01 January 2008
- Comparative Politics is an international journal that publishes scholarly articles devoted to the comparative analysis of political institutions and behavior. It was founded in 1968 to further the development of comparative political theory and the application of comparative theoretical analysis to the empirical investigation of political issues. Comparative Politics communicates new ideas and research findings to social scientists, scholars, and students, and is valued by experts in research organizations, foundations, and consulates throughout the world.
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