Bidding system for allocating forest concessions in Africa
Concession allocation by competitive bidding is always fiercely resisted by the local forest industrialists, and sometimes even by members of the forest service. One will be told that It can't be done, It is too complicated, It is too expensive or some such thing. Of course people who
benefit from arbitrary allocation will oppose a more objective, transparent and equitable mechanism. It is nonsense to say that it cannot be done, but it will only be done where there are considerable incentives, for example in the form of major grants or loans on favourable terms. The competitive
bidding system proposed in this article can considerably increase the revenue of the forest owners, correcting the perennial problem of under-valuation, which not only reduces the revenues of the forest owners but also encourages over-cutting. Bidding can also reduce corruption, although it
can of course also be and often is undermined by corruption.
Keywords: auction; bidding; concession; logging; tender
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Forest economics consultant.
Publication date: 01 June 2010
- The International Forestry Review is a peer-reviewed scholarly journal that publishes original research and review papers on all aspects of forest policy and science, with an emphasis on issues of transnational significance. It is published four times per year, in March, June, September and December. Theme editions are a regular feature and attract a wide audience.
The IFR is part of The Global Forest Information Service - GFIS
International Forestry Review has an Impact Factor of 1.705 - Editorial Board
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