The Moral Worth of Creatures: Neo-Classical Metaphysics and the Value Theories of Rolston and Callicott
Author: Benzoni, Francisco
Source: Environmental Values, Volume 18, Number 1, February 2009 , pp. 5-32(28)
Publisher: White Horse Press
Abstract:
After showing that Rolston's and Callicott's value theories are fundamentally flawed, I demonstrate that a value theory grounded in neoclassical, or process, metaphysics avoids the problems in, and incorporates insights from, these accounts. A fundamental thesis of neoclassical metaphysics is that individual creatures at all levels of reality (from non-sensuous, non-conscious to self-conscious) are subjects of experience. Since individuals are subjects, this value theory meets Callicott's legitimate demand that value requires a valuer. And because such subjectivity does not depend on consciousness, this theory meets Rolston's legitimate demand that intrinsic value not depend upon human valuation.Keywords: environmental ethics; moral worth; intrinsic value; metaphysics
Document Type: Research article
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3197/096327109X404717
Publication date: 2009-02-01
- In this: publication
- By this: publisher
- In this Subject: Ecology , Philosophy
- By this author: Benzoni, Francisco

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