The Moral Worth of Creatures: Neo-Classical Metaphysics and the Value Theories of Rolston and Callicott

Author: Benzoni, Francisco

Source: Environmental Values, Volume 18, Number 1, February 2009 , pp. 5-32(28)

Publisher: White Horse Press

Key:

- Free Content

- New Content

- Subscribed Content

- Free Trial Content

Abstract:

After showing that Rolston's and Callicott's value theories are fundamentally flawed, I demonstrate that a value theory grounded in neoclassical, or process, metaphysics avoids the problems in, and incorporates insights from, these accounts. A fundamental thesis of neoclassical metaphysics is that individual creatures at all levels of reality (from non-sensuous, non-conscious to self-conscious) are subjects of experience. Since individuals are subjects, this value theory meets Callicott's legitimate demand that value requires a valuer. And because such subjectivity does not depend on consciousness, this theory meets Rolston's legitimate demand that intrinsic value not depend upon human valuation.

Keywords: environmental ethics; moral worth; intrinsic value; metaphysics

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.3197/096327109X404717

The full text electronic article is available for purchase. You will be able to download the full text electronic article after payment.

$26.27 plus tax Refund Policy