Why the Naive Argument against Moral Vegetarianism Really is Naive

Author: Benatar, D.

Source: Environmental Values, Volume 10, Number 1, 1 February 2001 , pp. 103-112(10)

Publisher: White Horse Press

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Abstract:

When presented with the claim of the moral vegetarian that it is wrong for us to eat meat, many people respond that because it is not wrong for lions, tigers and other carnivores to kill and eat animals, it cannot be wrong for humans to do so. This response is what Peter Alward has called the naive argument. Peter Alward has defended the naive argument against objections. I argue that his defence fails.

Keywords: vegetarianism; naive argument

Document Type: Research article

Publication date: 2001-02-01

More about this publication?
  • Environmental Values is an international peer-reviewed journal that brings together contributions from philosophy, economics, politics, sociology, geography, anthropology, ecology and other disciplines, which relate to the present and future environment of human beings and other species. In doing so we aim to clarify the relationship between practical policy issues and more fundamental underlying principles or assumptions.

    Environmental Values has an impact factor (2011) of 1.372
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