The Naive Argument against Moral Vegetarianism

Author: Alward, P.

Source: Environmental Values, Volume 9, Number 1, 1 February 2000 , pp. 81-89(9)

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Abstract:

The naive argument against moral vegetarianism claims that if it is wrong for us to eat meant then it is wrong for lions and tigers to do so as well. I argue that the fact that such carnivores lack higher order mental states and need meat to survive do suffice to undermine the naive argument.

Keywords: ethics; applied ethics; vegetarianism; animal welfare; naive argument

Document Type: Research article

Publication date: 2000-02-01

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Environmental Values is an international peer-reviewed journal that brings together contributions from philosophy, economics, politics, sociology, geography, anthropology, ecology and other disciplines, which relate to the present and future environment of human beings and other species. In doing so we aim to clarify the relationship between practical policy issues and more fundamental underlying principles or assumptions.

Environmental Values has an impact factor (2011) of 1.372
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