Recognition of intentionality and the possibility of agency in nonhuman others is a prerequisite for a process of mutual adjustment and dialogue that could replace current reductive and dualistic human-centred theories. John Andrews' article in this issue of Environmental Values is criticised for misattributing to me the view that intentionality could be a sole criterion for moral worth - a view which I reject as unacceptably hierarchical and human-centred. To clarify my position, the values and limitations of different kinds of ranking are discussed; and the concept of intentionality is explored, with particular reference to apparently purposeful machines and to Dennett's theory of consciousness.
Environmental Values is an international peer-reviewed journal that brings together contributions from philosophy, economics, politics, sociology, geography, anthropology, ecology and other disciplines, which relate to the present and future environment of human beings and other species. In doing so we aim to clarify the relationship between practical policy issues and more fundamental underlying principles or assumptions.
Environmental Values has an impact factor (2013) of 1.739.