I propose that precaution be introduced in exploitation of natural resources by means of a performance bond, which exploiters would be required to purchase, to be paid in case of collapse of the stock. The size of the penalty would not be determined solely on the basis of economic considerations
but would be chosen to promote more precaution in exploitation. I perform calculations to show how such a requirement can discourage risky polices and reduce the impact of policies that are optimal under the system of penalties. The insurance premium for the performance bond would be responsive
to various factors that influence the probability of collapse, including nonnormal distribution of process noise, critical depensation, possible catastrophes in recruitment or survival, and uncertainty about parameters of the stock-recruit relationship. Such a system of penalties may remove
some of the vagueness that has plagued attempts to define and implement precautionary policies.
The Bulletin of Marine Science is dedicated to the dissemination of high quality research from the world's oceans. All aspects of marine science are treated by the Bulletin of Marine Science, including papers in marine biology, biological oceanography, fisheries, marine affairs, applied marine physics, marine geology and geophysics, marine and atmospheric chemistry, and meteorology and physical oceanography.