An Explanation of Inefficiencies in the Pelota Betting Market: Rank Dependent Expected Utility

Author: Llorente, Loreto

Source: The Journal of Gambling Business and Economics, Volume 1, Number 2, June 2007 , pp. 147-163(17)

Publisher: University of Buckingham Press

Buy & download fulltext article:

OR

Price: $40.68 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

In Pelota matches, games with two mutually exclusive and exhaustive outcomes, bets on the winner are made through a middleman who receives 16% of the finally paid amount. The classical decision theory of expected utility maximization can not explain this market assuming bettors are identical. Llorente and Aizpurua (2007) explain the existence of bets in the market under Quiggin's rank dependent expected utility (RDEU) model. They find that bettors have to be optimistic in order to explain the existence of a bet. Analyzing the way odds are fixed in the market Llorente (2006) finds that assuming equal return on bets there are inefficiencies in the market. In this paper we show that, given an assumption that bettors are rank dependent expected utility maximizers, these inefficiencies tend to disappear.

Keywords: BETTING; PELOTA BETTING SYSTEM; SPORT BETTING; MARKET EFFICIENCY; RANK DEPENDENT EXPECTED UTILITY; INDIVIDUAL DECISION MAKING

Document Type: Research article

Publication date: 2007-06-01

More about this publication?
Related content

Tools

Key

Free Content
Free content
New Content
New content
Open Access Content
Open access content
Subscribed Content
Subscribed content
Free Trial Content
Free trial content

Text size:

A | A | A | A
Share this item with others: These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and discover new web pages. print icon Print this page