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The shirking bureaucrat: a theory in search of evidence?

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The article addresses the issue of public sector work motivation, particular the notion of bureaucratic 'shirking'. Although a popular theoretical model among public choice scholars of public administration, the 'shirking' argument has not been empirically supported. The article compares two organisational models of ensuring public servants' compliance; a contract regime which is common in public-interest-based, Anglo American countries, and a trust-based regime found in Continental European, Scandinavian and Asian administrative systems.
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Keywords: PRINCIPAL–AGENT MODEL; PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION; PUBLIC ETHOS; PUBLIC MANAGEMENT

Document Type: Research Article

Affiliations: 1: Email: [email protected] 2: Email: [email protected]

Publication date: 2017-04-01

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