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What Restoration Schemes Can Do? Or, Getting It Right Without Fisheries Transferable Quotas

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Abstract:

Under the Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) schemes, the economic calculations fail to reflect a just distribution of wealth and results in deprivation of the public trust of fisheries. Some “neoclassic” economists claim that ITQs cost-efficiently eliminate the tragedy of the commons. However, Norwegian cost–benefit studies indicate a financial loss for second-generation ITQ owners due to the high price of tradable quotas. The financial burden caused by ITQs creates overfishing and pressure on the fishing stocks, which puts coastal municipalities at risk. If future fisheries are given legal protection, the losses due to hazardous fishing or overexploiting stocks is the fisherman's liability. Restoration schemes within the framework of total allowable catch (TAC) are an alternative to ITQs that may prevent resource depletion and the “tragedy of the commons.”

Keywords: Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs); resource depletion; restoration schemes; the robbery of the commons

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320590944025

Affiliations: Faculty of Law University of Zagreb, Hrvatska, Croatia

Publication date: 2005-04-01

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