Skip to main content

Gödel on Concepts

Buy Article:

$55.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

This article is an attempt to present Gödel's discussion on concepts, from 1944 to the late 1970s, in particular relation to the thought of Frege and Russell. The discussion takes its point of departure from Gödel's claim in notes on Bernay's review of ‘Russell's mathematical logic'. It then retraces the historical background of the notion of intension which both Russell and Gödel use, and offers some grounds for claiming that Gödel consistently considered logic as a free-type theory of concepts, called intensions, considered as the denotations of predicate names.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/01445340500285300

Affiliations: CEPERC, Université Aix-Marseille I, 29 av. Robert Schuman, 13621, Aix-en-Provence cedex 01, France

Publication date: 2006-05-01

More about this publication?
  • Access Key
  • Free ContentFree content
  • Partial Free ContentPartial Free content
  • New ContentNew content
  • Open Access ContentOpen access content
  • Partial Open Access ContentPartial Open access content
  • Subscribed ContentSubscribed content
  • Partial Subscribed ContentPartial Subscribed content
  • Free Trial ContentFree trial content
Cookie Policy
X
Cookie Policy
Ingenta Connect website makes use of cookies so as to keep track of data that you have filled in. I am Happy with this Find out more