Against Logical Realism

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This paper argues against Logical Realism, in particular against the view that there are facts of matters of logic that obtain independently of us, our linguistic conventions and inferential practices. The paper challenges logical realists to provide a non-intuition based epistemology, one which would be compatible with the empiricist and naturalist convictions motivating much recent anti-realist philosophy of mathematics.

Document Type: Research Article


Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Caldwell Hall, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3125, USA

Publication date: October 1, 1999

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