Author: Eliasmith C.

Source: Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, Volume 14, Number 1, 1 March 2002 , pp. 1-8(8)

Publisher: Taylor and Francis Ltd

Abstract:

The properties of Turing's famous 'universal machine' has long sustained functionalist intuitions about the nature of cognition. This paper shows that there is a logical problem with standard functionalist arguments for multiple realizability. These arguments rely essentially on Turing's powerful insights regarding computation. In addressing a possible reply to this criticism, it is further argued that functionalism is not a useful approach for understanding what it is to have a mind. In particular, it is shown that the difficulties involved in distinguishing implementation from function make multiple realizability claims untestable and uninformative. As a result, it is concluded that the role of Turing machines in philosophy of mind needs to be reconsidered.

Keywords: TURING MACHINE; FUNCTIONALISM; MULTIPLE REALIZABILITY; COMPUTATIONAL; EQUIVALENCE; PHILOSOPHY OF MIND; KOLMOGOROV

Document Type: Research article

Publication date: 2002-03-01

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