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Computationalism is dead; now what?

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In this paper I put Jim Fetzer's esemplastic burial of the computational conception of mind within the context of both my own burial and the theory of mind I would put in place of this dead doctrine. My view in a nutshell: Computationalism will yield Total Turing Test-passing zombies (in the philosopher's sense of 'zombie'), but replicating persons will be unreachable for two reasons. Firstly, persons process information at a 'super'-Turing level; secondly, people enjoy certain properties (e.g. intentionality) beyond the reach of any mere information-processing object. Accordingly, computationalism ought to be supplanted with the engineering of 'subperson' artifacts and the irreducibly philosophical investigation of personhood. I end with nascent appraisal of Fetzer's interesting semiotic connectionist replacement for computationalism.
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Keywords: COMPUTATIONALISM TURING TEST SUPER-COMPUTATION

Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: 1998-10-01

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