Universal forgery on Sekhar's signature scheme with message recovery

Authors: F. Laguillaumie; J. Traoré; D. Vergnaud

Source: International Journal of Computer Mathematics, Volume 81, Number 12, December 2004 , pp. 1493-1495(3)

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Abstract:

Owing to the abundance of electronic applications of digital signatures, many additional properties are needed. Recently, Sekhar [Sekhar, M. R. (2004). Signature scheme with message recovery and its application. Int. J. Comput. Math., 81(3), 285-289.] proposed three signature schemes with message recovery designed to protect the identity of the signer. In this setting, only a specific verifier can check the validity of a signature, and he can transmit this conviction to a third party. In this note, we show that this protocol is totally insecure, as it is universally forgeable under a no-message attack. In other words, we show that anyone can forge a valid signature of a user on an arbitrary message. The forged signatures are unconditionally indistinguishable (in an information theoretical sense) from properly formed signatures.†

E-mail: jacques.traore@francetelecom.com‡

E-mail: vergnaud@math.unicaen.fr

Keywords: Cryptography; Universal Forgery; Designated Verifier Signatures; Message Recovery

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020716042000272520

Publication date: 2004-12-01

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