Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Trust

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Abstract:

Miranda Fricker has introduced the insightful notion of epistemic injustice in the philosophical debate, thus bridging concerns of social epistemology with questions that arise in the area of social and cultural studies. I concentrate my analysis of her treatment of testimonial injustice. According to Fricker, the central cases of testimonial injustice are cases of identity injustice in which hearers rely on stereotypes to assess the credibility of their interlocutors. I try here to broaden the analysis of that testimonial injustice by indicating other mechanisms that bias our credibility assessments. In my perspective, the use of identity stereotypes is just one case among many biases in our credibility judgments.

Keywords: Credibility; Epistemic Responsibility; Epistemic Trust; Epistemic Vigilance

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652213

Publication date: April 1, 2012

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