Reply to Kvanvig on the Swamping Problem
According to the so-called swamping problem, reliabilist knowledge is no more valuable than mere true belief. In a paper called “Reliabilism and the value of knowledge” (in Epistemic value, edited by A. Haddock, A. Millar, and D. H. Pritchard, pp. 19-41. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), Alvin I. Goldman and myself proposed, among other things, a solution based on conditional probabilities. This approach, however, is heavily criticized by Jonathan L. Kvanvig in his paper “The swamping problem redux: Pith and gist” (in Social Epistemology, edited by A. Haddock, A. Millar, and D. H. Pritchard, pp. 89-111. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). In the present article, I defend the conditional probability solution against Kvanvig's objections.
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Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: 2011-04-01