Democracy and Nuclear Arms Control—Destiny or Ambiguity?

Authors: Becker, Una¹; Muller, Harald²; Wisotzki, Simone³

Source: Security Studies, Volume 17, Number 4, October 2008 , pp. 810-854(45)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

Buy & download fulltext article:

Price: $50.43 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

Is there a particularly democratic way of dealing with nuclear arms control? Against the background of democratic peace (DP) theory, and using Immanuel Kant's writing as a starting point, this article argues that democracies should indeed develop a preference for arms control, but that Liberalism as well as the nature of nuclear weapons opens the possibility for contingent developments within a DP framework. While DP theory can thus account for the existence of variance, we maintain that a social constructivist complement based on role, identity, and enemy perception can best explain why a given democracy follows a specific path. Case studies of six Western democracies reveal a considerable variance in their nuclear arms control policies, which can indeed be traced back to the countries' respective roles, identities, and images of the Kantian “unjust enemy.”

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636410802507941

Affiliations: 1: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. University of Frankfurt, 3: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. Technical University of Darmstadt,

Publication date: 2008-10-01