Comments on Guyer

Author: Allison, Henry

Source: Inquiry, Volume 50, Number 5, October 2007 , pp. 480-488(9)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

Buy & download fulltext article:

Price: $49.55 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

Guyer argues for four major theses. First, in his early, pre-critical discussions of morality, Kant advocated a version of rational egoism, in which freedom, understood naturalistically as a freedom from domination by both one's own inclinations and from other people, rather than happiness, is the fundamental value. From this point of view, the function of the moral law is to prescribe rules best suited to the preservation and maximization of such freedom, just as on the traditional eudaemonistic account it is to prescribe rules for the maximization of happiness. Second, in the Groundwork, Kant abandoned this naturalistic approach and while retaining the same substantive thesis as his early moral philosophy, "namely that freedom is the value that is realized by adherence to the moral law" (Guyer 455), attempted to provide a non-naturalistic (transcendental) grounding for this valuation of freedom. Third, this took the form of a transcendental deduction, closely modeled on that of the first Critique, which was intended to demonstrate that we are in fact (noumenally) free and the moral law is the "causal law" of this freedom. Fourth, this deduction is a disaster, indeed, one of Western philosophy's "most spectacular train wrecks" (Guyer 445). I shall discuss each in turn, devoting the bulk of my attention to the last.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00201740701612341

Affiliations: 1: University of California, Davis, USA

Publication date: 2007-10-01

More about this publication?