Idealism and the Philosophy of Mind1

Author: D'Oro, Giuseppina

Source: Inquiry, Volume 48, Number 5, 01Oct2005 , pp. 395-412(18)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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Abstract:

This paper defends an idealist form of non-reductivism in the philosophy of mind. I refer to it as a kind of conceptual dualism without substance dualism. I contrast this idealist alternative with the two most widespread forms of non-reductivism: multiple realisability functionalism and anomalous monism. I argue first, that functionalism fails to challenge seriously the claim for methodological unity since it is quite comfortable with the idea that it is possible to articulate a descriptive theory of the mind. Second, that as an attempt to graft conceptual mind-body dualism onto a monistic metaphysics, the idealist alternative bears some similarities to anomalous monism, but that it is superior to it because it is not vulnerable to the charge of epiphenomenalism. I conclude that this idealist alternative should be given serious consideration by those who remain unconvinced that a successful defence of the non-reducibility of the mental is compatible with the pursuit of a naturalistic agenda.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00201740500241847

Affiliations: 1: University of Keele, UK

Publication date: 2005-10-01

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