The Voluntariness of Judgment: Reply to Stein

Author: Walker M.

Source: Inquiry, Volume 41, Number 3, 1 September 1998 , pp. 333-339(7)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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Abstract:

I have maintained that judgments must be voluntary since, as truth-aimed, they may be represented as responses to practical reasons. Christian Stein has objected that this argument cannot apply to judgments which are not the outcomes of theoretical reasoning. Furthermore, he contends that I have not succeeded in overcoming an argument of H. H. Price"s to the effect that judgments which are such outcomes cannot be voluntary. I argue below that neither of these objections can be sustained.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

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