Client focus in regulatory agencies

Authors: Alford, John1; Speed, Richard2

Source: Public Management Review, Volume 8, Number 2, June 2006 , pp. 313-331(19)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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Abstract:

`Client focus' seems like a counter-intuitive notion for regulatory agencies, whose job is to compel people to comply with government requirements. Yet it is becoming the catchphrase for many regulatory authorities. This article puts forward an argument, based on social exchange and regulatory theory, that a client-focused approach is not only compatible with a regulatory role, but also actually facilitates it. It recognizes that most people's propensity to comply is a function of factors other than the fear of punishment, such as their intrinsic or normative motivations and their ability to do what is required. It also assists in delineation and understanding of the proportion of regulatees who opportunistically avoid their obligations. The article advances a broader model of social exchange between regulators and regulatees.

Keywords: Client focus; compliance; regulation; responsive regulation; social exchange

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1080/14719030600587703

Affiliations: 1: Melbourne Business School, University of Melbourne, 200 Leicester, St Carlton, Vic, 3053, Australia, +61 (0) 3 8344 1975 2: Melbourne Business School, University of Melbourne, 200 Leicester St, Carlton, Vic, 3053, Australia, +61 (0) 3 9349 8199

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