Standing up for an affective account of emotion

Author: Whiting, Demian

Source: Philosophical Explorations, Volume 9, Number 3, September 2006 , pp. 261-276(16)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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Abstract:

This paper constitutes a defence of an affective account of emotion. I begin by outlining the case for thinking that emotions are just feelings. I also suggest that emotional feelings are not reducible to other kinds of feelings, but rather form a distinct class of feeling state. I then consider a number of common objections that have been raised against affective accounts of emotion, including: (1) the objection that emotion cannot always consist only of feeling because some emotions—for example, indignation and regret—necessarily have a cognitive component (say, the perception of a lost opportunity in the case of regret); (2) the objection that emotion cannot consist only of feeling because in order to explain how emotions have intentional objects we will have to recognise that emotion consists of cognition; and (3) the objection that emotion cannot consist only of feeling because emotion, but not feeling, can be variously assessed or evaluated. However, I demonstrate how an affective account of emotion might be successfully defended against all of the objections that are cited.

Keywords: emotion; feeling; phenomenology; cognition; intentionality; evaluation

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869790600815764

Affiliations: 1: Division of Primary Care, University of Liverpool, Whelan Building, Brownlow Hill, Liverpool, L69 3GB, UK

Publication date: 2006-09-01