Intentions are mental states

Authors: Zhu, Jing¹; Buckareff, Andrei²

Source: Philosophical Explorations, Volume 9, Number 2, June 2006 , pp. 235-242(8)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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Abstract:

Richard Scheer has recently argued against what he calls the `mental state' theory of intentions. He argues that versions of this theory fail to account for various characteristics of intention. In this essay we reply to Scheer's criticisms and argue that intentions are mental states.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869790600641954

Affiliations: 1: Department of Social Sciences, Graduate School of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, 100049, China 2: Department of Philosophy, Franklin & Marshall College, P.O. Box 3003, Lancaster, PA, 17604-3003, USA

Publication date: 2006-06-01