Bad acts, blameworthy agents, and intentional actions: Some problems for juror impartiality

Author: Nadelhoffer, Thomas

Source: Philosophical Explorations, Volume 9, Number 2, June 2006 , pp. 203-219(17)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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Abstract:

In this paper, I first review some of the recent empirical work on the biasing effect that moral considerations have on folk ascriptions of intentional action. Then, I use Mark Alicke's affective model of blame attribution to explain this biasing effect. Finally, I discuss the relevance of this research—both philosophical and psychological—to the problem of the partiality of jury deliberation. After all, if the immorality of an action does affect folk ascriptions of intentionality, and all serious criminal offenses—e.g., murder and rape—are immoral in addition to being illegal, then a juror's ability to determine the relevant mens rea (i.e., guilty mind) of a defendant in an unbiased way may be seriously undermined.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869790600641905

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, 32306-1500, USA

Publication date: 2006-06-01