The role of judgement

Author: Luntley, Michael

Source: Philosophical Explorations, Volume 8, Number 3, September 2005 , pp. 281-295(15)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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Abstract:

In this essay I explore one way of making sense of the idea that 'judgement' picks out a singular cognitive operation that cannot be modelled in terms of rule application. I argue that there is a place for noting a distinctive capacity for coming to a view about what to think and what to do and that this capacity is best understood in terms of singular attentional states. On the account that I sketch, the role of judgement contributes to the metaphysics of reasoning, not to a debate within the logic of reasons. The role of judgement is not concerned with particularist versus generalist debates about the nature of reasons; it is concerned with getting right the metaphysics of agency in reasoning.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869790500219620

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK

Publication date: 2005-09-01