Fetuses, corpses and the psychological approach to personal identity

Author: Robert Francescotti

Source: Philosophical Explorations, Volume 8, Number 1, March 2005 , pp. 69-81(13)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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Abstract:

Olson (1997a) tries to refute the Psychological Approach to personal identity with his Fetus Argument, and Mackie (1999) aims to do the same with the Death Argument. With the help of a suggestion made by Baker (1999), the following discussion shows that these arguments fail. In the process of defending the Psychological Approach, it is made clear exactly what one is and is not committed to as a proponent of the theory.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1386979042000336144

Affiliations: 1: Philosophy Department San Diego State University San Diego CA 92182 USA

Publication date: 2005-03-01