Bodily knowing

Author: Garry Young

Source: Philosophical Explorations, Volume 7, Number 1, March 2004 , pp. 37-54(18)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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Abstract:

This paper questions the view that knowledge must be articulable or at least experiential. It asserts that what distinguishes habitual yet intentional action from a mechanistic response is its grounding in a suitable claim to knowledge. However, it denies that a necessary condition for knowing how to perform an action is the ability of the subject to either articulate the particulars of that act, or experience it as appropriate.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1386979032000186845

Publication date: 2004-03-01