Political Preferences, Revealed Positions and Strategic Votes: Explaining Decision-Making in the EU Council

Authors: Sullivan, Jonathan; Selck, Torsten

Source: Journal of European Public Policy, Volume 14, Number 7, October 2007 , pp. 1150-1161(12)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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Abstract:

This paper summarizes the state of affairs regarding formal and quantitative studies on decision-making in the Council of the European Union. We compare recent empirical studies in the field and distinguish between work that utilizes actors' ideal preferences, their revealed positions in the bargaining process, and their subsequent voting records in the area of EU legislative politics. We argue that document analysis remains an underemployed tool that could help formal modellers in confronting their theories with quantitative empirical information.

Keywords: Bargaining; Council; decision-making; European Union; modelling

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501760701576643

Publication date: 2007-10-01

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