Endogenous retailer preferences in intermediate good markets

$54.78 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Buy Article:

Abstract:

We model strategic interaction in a differentiated input market as a game among two suppliers and n retailers. Each one of the upstream firms chooses the specification of the input which it will offer.Then, retailers choose their type from a continuum of possibilities. The decisions made in these two first stages affect the degree of compatibility between each retailer's ideal input specification and that of the inputs offered by the two upstream firms. In a third stage, upstream firms compete setting input prices. Equilibrium may be of the two-vendor policy or of the technological monopoly type.

Keywords: DIFFERENTIATED INPUTS; ENDOGENOUS TASTES; RETAILER OLIGOPSONY; TECHNOLOGY-ORGANIZATION CHOICE

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09593960122186

Publication date: April 1, 2001

More about this publication?
Related content

Share Content

Access Key

Free Content
Free content
New Content
New content
Open Access Content
Open access content
Subscribed Content
Subscribed content
Free Trial Content
Free trial content
Cookie Policy
X
Cookie Policy
ingentaconnect website makes use of cookies so as to keep track of data that you have filled in. I am Happy with this Find out more