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Endogenous retailer preferences in intermediate good markets

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We model strategic interaction in a differentiated input market as a game among two suppliers and n retailers. Each one of the upstream firms chooses the specification of the input which it will offer.Then, retailers choose their type from a continuum of possibilities. The decisions made in these two first stages affect the degree of compatibility between each retailer's ideal input specification and that of the inputs offered by the two upstream firms. In a third stage, upstream firms compete setting input prices. Equilibrium may be of the two-vendor policy or of the technological monopoly type.
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Keywords: DIFFERENTIATED INPUTS; ENDOGENOUS TASTES; RETAILER OLIGOPSONY; TECHNOLOGY-ORGANIZATION CHOICE

Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: 2001-04-01

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