Author: Norris Christopher

Source: International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 12, Number 3, 2004 , pp. 357-374(18)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

Abstract:

This essay responds to Jeff Malpas's foregoing article, itself written in response to my various publications over the past two decades concerning Donald Davidson's ideas about truth, meaning, and interpretation. It has to do mainly with our disagreement as regards the substantive content of Davidson's truth-based semantic approach in relation to the problematic legacy of logical empiricism, including Quine's incisive but no less problematical critique of that legacy. I also raise questions with respect to Malpas's coupling of Davidson with Heidegger, intended to provide a more adequate depth-ontological grounding for the formalized (logico-semantic) conception of truth that Davidson adopts from Tarski. My essay then argues the case for an outlook of objectivist causal realism joined with a theory of inference to the best, most rational explanation that would satisfy this need in more philosophically (as well as scientifically) accountable terms.

Keywords: Davidson; Heidegger; interpretation; Quine; realism; truth

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0967255042000243993

Publication date: 2004-01-01

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