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Relativism and the abolition of the other

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Abstract:

In this paper I consider the 'disappearing we' account of Wittgenstein's attitude to other ways of thought or other 'conceptual schemes'. I argue that there is no evidence that Wittgenstein expected the 'we' to disappear, in the manner of Davidson, and that his affinities with relativistic trains of thought in fact go much deeper

Keywords: Davidson; Wittgenstein; conceptual schemes; experience; relativism

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0967255042000243939

Publication date: January 1, 2004

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