Multiplicity: A New Reading of Sartrean Bad Faith
In this article I introduce a new reading of Jean-Paul Sartre's account of bad faith. The reading contrasts with previous accounts by denying that states of bad faith are exhausted by attitudes towards transcendence and facticity. Instead, I argue that bad faith can involve attitudes to many other aspects of the human being. I also respond to an argument which claims that affirmations of freedom are inconsistent with the motivations behind bad faith. The inconsistency is here resolved by demonstrating how in bad faith we can still affirm a restricted version of freedom which avoids us acknowledging the unpleasant aspects of our full freedom.
No Reference information available - sign in for access.
No Citation information available - sign in for access.
No Supplementary Data.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: King's College London,
Publication date: 2012-05-01